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"the ultimate and essential goal of all law...[is] to promote and to guarantee the dignity of the human 
person." (Mamberti, 2012) 
 
Abstract 
7KH LGHDRI µKXPDQGLJQLW\¶ LV QRWRULRXVO\ DV ambiguous as it is compelling. Notwithstanding the 
absence of any clear or settled definition of human dignity, either in the abstract or in terms of what it 
means in practice, it is an idea which takes pride of place in international legal documents, in judicial 
reasoning, and in scholarship across a range of disciplines, where it seems, particularly in recent 
years, to have become the focus for an explosion of academic interest and an accompanying 
proliferation of literature. Much of the existing literature attempts to uncover the meaning, or 
PXOWLSOH PHDQLQJV RI µKXPDQ GLJQLW\¶ IRFXVLQJ RQ WKH XQFHUWDLQW\ VXUURXQGLQJ WKH VXEVWDQFH RU
content of the idea and trying to compose a catalogue of use-types. In this article, my primary aim 
will be to address another type of uncertainty, namely uncertainty about the role, function, or status 
within legal frameworks RIWKHµGLJQLW\QRUP¶± the norm requiring respect for human dignity.  I want 
to explore several possibilities: first, that the dignity norm is simply a proxy for respect for autonomy; 
VHFRQGWKDWLWLVDULJKWLQWKHVHQVHWKDWZHFDQVSHDNRIDVSHFLILFµULJKWWRKDYHGLJQLW\UHVSHFWHG¶
and third, that it is a legal principle. Having problematised each of these in turn, I will contend that 
the functLRQRIWKHGLJQLW\QRUPLVEHVWFDSWXUHGE\GHVFULELQJLWDVWKHµVXEVWDQWLYHEDVLFQRUP¶RIWKH
legal systems wherein it appears.  
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The idea of human dignity has undoubted legal presence. It has, famously, a prominent place in the 
8QLYHUVDO'HFODUDWLRQRQ+XPDQ5LJKWVZKHUHLQWKH3UHDPEOHUHIHUVWR³WKHLQKHUHQWGLJQLW\DQGWKH
HTXDO DQG LQDOLHQDEOH ULJKWV RI DOO PHPEHUV RI WKH KXPDQ IDPLO\´ DQG $UWLFOH  DVVHUWV WKDW ³>D@OO
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and righWV´Similarly, Article 1 of the EU Charter of 
)XQGDPHQWDO5LJKWVGHFODUHVWKDW³+XPDQGLJQLW\LVLQYLRODEOH,WPXVWEHUHVSHFWHGDQGSURWHFWHG´
Dignity KDVDOVREHHQGHVFULEHGDV³WKHYHU\HVVHQFH´RIWKH(XURSHDQ&RQYHQWLRQRQ+XPDQ5LJKWV1 
The idea has been referenced again and again by courts in a host of recent cases spanning a range of 
different areas of law: the dignity of same-sex couples,2 patients,3 prisoners,4 detainees,5 asylum 
seekers, 6 women seeking abortions,7 and people wishing to end their lives.8 Over twenty years ago, 
RQH OHJDO REVHUYHU QRWHG WKDW ³KXPDQ GLJQLW\«LV QRW DQ DEVWUDFW PHWDSK\VLFDO QRWLRQ LW LV DQ
HVWDEOLVKHGDQGRUWKRGR[OHJDOFRQFHSW´9  
 The legal significance of dignity is also reflected in the volume of scholarship devoted to it: it 
seems remarkable that it was ever observed WKDW ³WKH OLWHUDWXUH RQ GLJQLW\ LV D VSDUVH RQH LQGHHG´
(Gaylin, 1984, p.18). It has been notedKRZHYHUWKDWGHVSLWHWKH³LQFUHDVHGDWWHQWLRQ´SDLGWRGLJQLW\
nowadays ³WKH QRWLRQ RI WKH role RI KXPDQ GLJQLW\ ZLWKLQ ODZ LV VWLOO DQ XQGHUH[SORUHG WRSLF´
(Glensy, 2011, p.66, emphasis added.) Some legal scholars, notably Dworkin (2006 and 2011), Alexy 
 DQG PRUH UHFHQWO\ :DOGURQ    DQG  KDYH H[DPLQHG GLJQLW\¶V UROH
within legal normativity, scrutinising its status, function, and, in particular, its relationship with rights. 
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Dupré, writing in the human rights law context, has asked: ³LV >GLJQLW\@ D ULJKW D YDOXH RU D
SULQFLSOH"´ 'XSUp  S DQG $QGRUQR KDV H[SORUHG ³WKH GXDO UROH RI KXPDQ GLJQLW\ LQ
ELRHWKLFV´$QGRUQRNevertheless, much academic enquiry about dignity still focuses on the 
content or meaning of dignity, asking what dignity values and why, without attending to the question 
of the role of the dignity norm in legal discourse.10   
 I have addressed matters of content elsewhere (Neal 2012a and 2012b), but the purpose of the 
present enquiry is to continue the emerging discussion of the role in law of what I will refer to 
hereafter as the µdiJQLW\ QRUP¶ WKH UHTXLUHPHQW Zhich may be explicit or implicit, written or 
unwritten, that the equal dignity of all human beings must be respected.11 Although it will be 
impossible not to touch upon matters of content in passing at various stages of the discussion, my 
primary purpose here is not WR HQTXLUH DERXW WKHQRUP¶V PHDQLQJEXW WR HVWDEOLVK LWs status. I will 
examine WKUHHFODLPVDERXWWKHGLJQLW\QRUPILUVWWKDWµUHVSHFW for GLJQLW\¶LVPHUHHPSW\UKHWRULF
and has no distinctive normative content of its own; second, that the dignity norm denotes a right, in 
WKHVHQVHRIWKHUHEHLQJDVSHFLILFµULJKWWRKDYHRQH¶VGLJQLW\UHVSHFWHG¶DQGWKLUGWKDWWKHQRUPLV
best understood as a legal principle (which may be fairly described as the majority view among 
dignity scholars in the human rights field and ± in some cases ± beyond). I will conclude that the 
QRUP¶Vlegal status is not captured adequately by any one of the above descriptions, and suggest that 
its role LVEHWWHUGHVFULEHGDVWKDWRIDµVXEVWDQWLYHEDVLFQRUP¶.  
 
II. The dignity norm as a proxy for respecting autonomy 
 
A major criticism of the idea of dignity per se KDVEHHQ WKDW µGLJQLW\¶GRHVQRWPHDQDQ\WKLQJ WKDW
cannot be expressed by reference to other values, particularly the principle of autonomy and the 
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 A recent exception is the collection of essays published in Human Dignity as a Foundation of Law: 
Proceedings of the Special Workshop held at the 24
th
 World Congress of the International Association for 
Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy in Beijing, 2009 (W. Brugger and S. Kirste, eds.) (Franz Steiner Verlag: 
Stuttgart, 2013) 
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 Elsewhere (Neal 2012a) I have argued that dignity can (unproblematically) mean different things in different 
ůĞŐĂůĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?/ƵƐĞƚŚĞƉŚƌĂƐĞ ?ĚŝŐŶŝƚǇŶŽƌŵ ?ƚŽŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƚŚĂƚŵǇ concern here is with 
general legal norms requiring respect for dignity, in which dignity will often (but not necessarily) be 
understood as referring to the intrinsic and/or equal worth of human beings.  
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UHODWHGLGHDRIµUHVSHFWIRUSHUVRQV¶0DFNOLQ3LQNHU12 For these critics, dignity is doing 
no distinctive normative work ± LV ³QRW D ORDG-EHDULQJ LGHD´ DV :DOGURQ SXWV LW :DOGURQ 2012, 
p.201) ± so is simply a ³UKHWRULFDORUQDPHQW´%DUURVRSZKLFKSHRSOHFLWH³ZKHQWKH\
ZDQWWRVRXQGVHULRXVEXWDUHQRWVXUHZKDWWRVD\´:DOGURQS 
  There is a longstanding tradition in European philosophy which, drawing on Kant, tends to 
GHILQHµGLJQLW\¶DVDproperty possessed by rational, autonomous beings ± beings governed by reason, 
with the emotions kept firmly in check (Harris, 1997). According to this tradition, the dignity (by 
ZKLFK.DQWPHDQV WKH³LQWULQVLFZRUWK´RIKXPDQEHLQJVIORZVXOWLPDWHO\IURP³XQLTXHO\KXPDQ´
capacities such as reason, autonomy and self-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ .DQW¶V SKLORVRSK\ KDV EHHQ KXJHO\
influential in shaping how philosophers and lawyers have conceptualised human dignity ever since, 
and it KDVEHHQUHPDUNHGWKDW.DQW¶VYHUVLRQRIGLJQLW\ZKLFKSXWVDXWRQRP\DQGUDWLRQDOLW\DW WKH
IRUHIURQW VWLOO UHIOHFWV³WKH FRQFHSWRIGLJQLW\ WKDW LVJHQHUDOO\ UHFRJQLVHG LQ3KLORVRSK\DQG/DZ´
WRGD\5WVFKHS5WVFKHZULWHVWKDW³7KHPRVt obvious properties which could be used 
[to justify the notion of human dignity] are the ability of human beings to think rationally and to 
choose freely. Consequently, it is the properties of reason and autonomy which distinguish the 
members of humankind DVXQLTXHDQGHQGRZWKHPZLWKGLJQLW\´S 
Other recent accounts of dignity which explicitly foreground the capacity for autonomy 
LQFOXGHWKRVHRI%DUURVRZKRGHVFULEHVLQGLYLGXDODXWRQRP\DV³the ethical element of human 
GLJQLW\´SDQG*ULIILQZKRKDVGHVFULEHGGLJQLW\DVFRQVWLWXWHGE\³WKHOLIHDXWRQRP\
DQGOLEHUW\RIWKHLQGLYLGXDO´*ULIILQSZKHUHDXWRQRP\LVDERXWGHOLEHUDWLRQDQG³KDV
to do with deciding for oQHVHOI´ S DQG OLEHUW\ LV DERXW DFWLRQ DQG ³FRQFHUQV SXUVXLQJ RQH¶V
DLPV ZLWKRXW LQWHUIHUHQFH´ S 7KLV WUDGLWLRQ RI WKRXJKW PD\ H[SODLQ ZK\ FULWLFV OLNH 0DFNOLQ
(2003) have come to regard the ideas of autonomy and dignity as being essentially synonymous with 
one another: in the influential Kantian way of understanding dignity, the idea of autonomy plays a 
major part in justifying the claim that human beings have dignity at all.  
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 Here, I want to focus on the conflation of dignity with autonomy in particular, since, although dignity is often 
ĞƋƵĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ ?ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĨŽƌƉĞƌƐŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞůŝŬĞ ?ƚŚĞƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇƚŽĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚŝŐŶŝƚǇǁŝƚŚĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇŝƐĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇ
ǁŝĚĞƐƉƌĞĂĚ ? ŶŽƚ ŽŶůǇ ĂŵŽŶŐ ĐƌŝƚŝĐƐ ǁŚŽ ĂƌŐƵĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĚŝŐŶŝƚǇ ŶŽƌŵ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐ  ?ŶŽ ŵŽƌĞ ƚŚĂŶ ? respect for 
autonomy (Macklin, 2003), but also among proponents of dignity who give autonomy a central place within 
their accounts of what dignity means. 
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 For those who make the explicit claim that dignity is reducible to autonomy, appeals to 
µGLJQLW\¶ DPRXQW WR QRWKLQJ PRUH WKDQ WKH FODLP WKDW SURFHVVHV RI DXWRQRPRXV LQGLYLGXDO VHOI-
determination ought not to be interfered with, and that the autonomous choices that are the outcomes 
of such processes ought to be respected. On such an understandingWKHSKUDVHµKXPDQGLJQLW\¶KDVno 
distinctive ethical content; everything it means is already captured more clearly and precisely by the 
principle of autonomy itself. But this kind of reductionism is unconvincing, whether it comes from 
advocates or detractors, and there are good reasons why dignity and autonomy ought to be regarded as 
separate values.  
First, if autonomy and dignity were essentially synonymous, then logically, only autonomous 
individuals could be said to possess dignity. We would have to be prepared to accept that it could 
PDNH QR VHQVH WR WDON DERXW µGLJQLW\¶ LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI YHU\ \RXQJ FKLOGUHQ HOGHUO\ SHRSOH ZLWK
dementia, adults with other forms of mental incapacity, unconscious patients, and so on. Schroeder 
KDV FDOOHG WKLV ³WKH .DQWLDQ FXO-de-VDF´ 6FKURHGHU  S13 The cul-de-sac is problematic 
strategically, because it is precisely in cases like these that the need to protect dignity can seem most 
urgent, and that reminders about human dignity can be most valuable. In the words of Baroness Hale 
RI 5LFKPRQG ³$OWKRXJK UHVSHFW IRU LQGLYLGXDO DXWRQRP\ LV DQ HVVHQWLDO SDUW RI UHVSHFW IRU KXPDQ
dignity, we are also required to respect the human dignity of those who are unable to make an 
DXWRQRPRXVFKRLFH,QIDFWLQP\YLHZLWLVHYHQPRUHLPSRUWDQWWKDWZHGRVR´+DOHS
The cul-de-sac is also philosophically-problematic insofar as a narrow conception of dignity 
XQGHUPLQHV GLJQLW\¶V SRWHQWLDO DV D VRXUFH RU MXVWLILFDWLRQ RI universal human rights: if dignity is 
conceived as attaching only to some human beings, it seems incapable of grounding rights for all of 
us. Perhaps this universal use of dignity is problematic already (see, e.g., Waldron, 2013) but the idea 
of dignity as a source of fundamental rights is currently one important mainstream understanding of 
ZKDWGLJQLW\µGRHV¶LQODZDQGDFFRXQWVWKDWDUHXQDEOHWRVXSSRUWWKLVXnderstanding may therefore 
lack intuitive appeal.  
                                                          
13
 The same problem (excessive restriction of the community of beings recognised as having dignity) also arises 
if we treat other cognitive capacities  ? reason, or moral agency, for example  ? as synonymous with dignity. I 
ŚĂǀĞ ĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇŚĞƌĞ ?ďƵƚ ƚƌĞĂƚŝŶŐĚŝŐŶŝƚǇĂƐ ƐǇŶŽŶǇŵŽƵƐǁŝƚŚĂŶǇ  ?ŚŝŐŚĞƌ ?ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇŽƌ
capacities is similarly problematic. 
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Another good reason to resist the conflation of dignity with autonomy is that it is possible to 
GLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQWKHPRQWKHEDVLVWKDWGLJQLW\XQOLNHDXWRQRP\LVZKDW,ZLOOFDOODµUHIOH[LYH
YDOXH¶ %RWK GLJQLW\ DQG DXWRQRP\ DUH RIWHQ GHVFULEHG DV KDYLQJ D QHFHVVDULO\ µUHODWLRQDO¶ TXDOLW\
)RVWHU  IRU H[DPSOH UHIHUV WR GLJQLW\ EHLQJ D ³FRPPXQLWDULDQ´ YDOXH WKDW LV KHOG ³LQ MRLQW
DFFRXQW´SWKLVLVEHFDXVHKHHTXDWHVGLJQLW\ZLWK³WKULYLQJ´DQGFRQWHQGVWKDW³LWLVLPSRVVLEOH
WR WDON VLPSO\ DERXW µP\¶ WKULYLQJ 0\ WKULYLQJ LV DIIHFWHG E\ DQG DIIHFWV D PXOWLWXGH RI RWKHU
organisms, and by the super-RUJDQLVP>WKHFRPPXQLW\@´S(OVHZKHUH%DUURVRFRQVLGHUV
³FRPPXQLW\ YDOXH´ DV D component in the meaning of dignity (although it seems to fulfil only a 
negative function within his analysis, as a brake on individual autonomy); Oliver (2010) considers 
dignity as essentially an act of recognition performed by the community; and Waldron (2008) 
considers the possibility that dignity might attach to communities or groups. The relational nature of 
autonomy has also been discussed extensively, particularly in feminist literature, including notable 
treatments by Nedelsky (1989) and MacKenzie & Stoljar (2000). 
Despite the relational nature of both values, however, there seems to be an important 
difference, in that violations of dignity can, in contrast with violations of autonomy, be understood as 
reflexive, so that when I violate your dignity, I necessarily and simultaneously violate my own. This 
seems to depend on conceiving dignity as a moral relationship, within which any act/omission which 
violates dignity violates it simultaneously and necessarily for all parties to the relationship. 
(ImpoUWDQWO\ ³DOO SDUWLHV´ FRXOG EH XQGHUVWRRG WR LQFOXGH WKH ZKROH RI WKH PRUDO FRPPXQLW\ LI
indeed the community has the kind of role in dignity encounters which Oliver claims.) Maier (2010) is 
one writer who maintains that acts of dignity-violation (he is primarily concerned with torture) are 
always wrong primarily because they distort and degrade the moral relationships between persons, 
DQGWKHVDPHLGHDLVSHUFHSWLEOHLQ+DOH¶VUHPDUNWKDW 
 






I can violate your autonomy without violating my own, and fail to respect your autonomy while my 
own autonomy remains completely unaffected. By contrast, if we understand dignity as a moral 
relationship (per Maier) and the community as a party to that relationship (per Oliver) we can then 
understand dignity as attaching to human beings and their communities in a reflexive way, so that 
when I violate your dignity, I am simultaneously failing to respect my own dignity and offending 
DJDLQVWWKHµFRPPXQLW\RIGLJQLW\¶  
 We can probably say of autonomy that if I violate or deny the autonomy of others, I am 
creating, or contributing to, a dangerous climate within which the autonomy of all autonomous beings, 
including myself, may be threatened.14 But this is not analogous to the claim that I do inevitable and 
simultaneous violence to my own dignity when I violate the dignity of another member of the 
community. In the latter case the claim is that a particular violation, when performed upon another 
person, immediately and necessarily causes the same kind of damage to the perpetrator. In the former, 
the claim is about risk of injury. ,IWKLVLVFRUUHFWWKHQDXWRQRP\LVQRWKHOGLQ³MRLQWDFFRXQW´  
A third reason to regard respect for autonomy as only part RIWKHµGLJQLW\SLFWXUH¶ is that not 
every violation of dignity involves a violation of autonomy, and vice versa. Certainly, if a person 
happens to have the capacity for autonomy, then failing to respect it (for example by obstructing or 
failing to support the exercise of the capacity, or by failing to respect the choices it generates) may 
YLRODWH WKDW SHUVRQ¶V GLJQLW\. Personal autonomy is, however, exercised and enjoyed in perpetual 
negotiation both with the autonomy of others and with the limits placed upon it by state authority in 
order to protect public order and prevent harm to others, and, although constraints on personal 
autonomy can be dignity-violating, they need not be. Conversely, there are things that someone might 
do to me that I would regard as an affront to my dignity, but which have nothing to do with violating 
P\ DXWRQRP\ )RU H[DPSOH 6FKDFKWHU KDV FRPPHQWHG WKDW ³QRWKLQJ LV VR FOHDUO\ YLRODWLYH RI WKH
GLJQLW\RISHUVRQVDVWUHDWPHQWWKDWGHPHDQVRUKXPLOLDWHVWKHP´6FKDFKWHUS\HWSHRSOH 
may be demeaned and humiliated in ways that involve no violation of autonomy. Thus, the fact that a 
particular individual lacks personal autonomy does not remove the potential for dignity-violation: 
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 Gewirth (1978) makes what might seem ůŝŬĞĂ ?ũŽŝŶƚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?-type argument about  moral agency when he 
argues that it is the kind of value which we deny in others only at risk of denying it in ourselves (his argument 
appears to be interpreted in this way by Smith (2008)).  
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although it must logically remove the possibility of violating WKDWLQGLYLGXDO¶V dignity via autonomy-
violation, it may also increase the danger that dignity will be violated in other ways (via contempt, or 
physical abuse, for example). 
It has been important to clarify that autonomy and dignity are not coextensive, not only for 
reasons of conceptual clarity, but also because whether we see the two as synonymous or not will 
LQIOXHQFH RXU YLHZ RI ZKDW µGLJQLW\¶ UHTXLUHV RI XV LQ FRQWH[WV OLNH DVVLVWHG G\LQJ UHSURGXFWLYH
freedom, human enhancement technologies, and so on (not necessarily determining the favoured 
outcome, but affecting how we get there). The distinction is thus of increasing practical and political 
significance. 
 
(d) The role of autonomy in the dignity picture 
An issue remains about what role DXWRQRP\ SOD\V LQ WKH µGLJQLW\ SLFWXUH¶ DQG KRZ ZH VKRXOG
conceive of the relationship between dignity and autonomy: is autonomy a facet or aspect of dignity 
(i.e. part of the definition of dignity itself), or a right flowing or resulting from dignity? This question 
LVRQHRIWKHVXEMHFWVRIDUHFHQWH[FKDQJHEHWZHHQ2¶0DKRQ\DDQGEDQG:KLWH
2¶0DKRQ\ QRWHV WKDW DV ZHOO DV EHLQJ SRVVHVVHG E\ VRPH SHRSOH DQG QRW RWKHUV ZKHUHDV human 
GLJQLW\ LV XVXDOO\ WUHDWHG DV EHLQJ XQLYHUVDO  ³personal autonomy is subject to restriction and 
limitation in ways that the inherent dignity of every individual that makes him or her worthy of equal 
WUHDWPHQWDQGUHVSHFWLVQRW´2¶0DKRQ\DS$VVXFKKHcontends that autonomy must be 
conceived RIDVDµUHVXOWLQJULJKW¶VLQFH 
 
 if autonomy is to be considered an aspect of dignity itself, then this suggests that dignity as a 
 concept is susceptible to frequent limitation by reference to other values and goals, in which 
 case its centrality in human rights law and discourse could be called into question. Moreover, 
 in difficult cases where autonomy is restricted precisely to protect the dignity of others, 
 characterizing autonomy as an aspect of dignity means that the dignity of one person is 
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 overridden by the dignity of another, which is difficult to reconcile with the concept of equal 
 WUHDWPHQWDQGUHVSHFW2¶0DKRQ\DS 
 
White (2012) counters that we can accept that autonomy is exclusive and subject to limitations, yet 
VWLOO VHHDXWRQRP\DVDFRQVWLWXHQWSDUWRID µXQLYHUVDODQGDEVROXWH¶GLJQLW\7KHUH LVQRQHHG VKH
suggests, to deny that autonomy can be an aspect of dignity simply because the former cannot be 
µUHDOLVHG FRPSOHWHO\¶ LQVWHDG ZH FDQ VD\ WKDW ³GLJQLW\ UHODWHV«WR WKH appropriate measure of 
DXWRQRP\´SHPSKDVLVDGGHG:KLWHDFNQRZOHGJHVWKDWGHFLGLQJZKDWWKHDSSURSULDWHPHDVXUH
RIDXWRQRP\LVLQDQ\JLYHQFDVH³ZLOOQDWXUDOO\EHFRQWHQWLRXV´SEXWXOWLPDWHO\VKHUHJDUGV
this as a separate issue. Assuming that autonomy can be balanced against competing values and 
realised to the degree that is appropriate (and this is a task we already trust to the courts), why can we 
not say that, in all cases involving autonomous people, realising (or allowing them to realise) their 
autonomy to the appropriate degree is an aspect of realisLQJWKHSHUVRQ¶VGLJQLW\" 
This seems like a reasonable point; it appears to acknowledge the connectedness between the 
two values, while leaving open the possibility of conceiving dignity in a way that has nothing to do 
with autonomy. (This possibility is important, because as noted already, some violations of dignity do 
not involve autonomy, even where we are dealing with the dignity of an autonomous person.) 
O¶0DKRQ\¶VUHOXFWDQFHWRDFFHSWLWVHHPVWREHGXHLQSDUWWRKLVHDJHUQHVVWRDYRLGZKDWKHVHHVDV
the erroneous idea that dignity can be a right-in-itself (discussed below), since, in his view, 
³FRQIXVLRQEHWZHHQDXWRQRP\DQGGLJQLW\FRQWULEXWHVWRWKHPLVJXLGHGQRWLRQRIDULJKWWRGLJQLW\´
2¶0DKRQ\DS 
 My concern so far has been to establish that dignity is not a mere proxy for autonomy, and 
that the two values, though connected, are ultimately distinct. I have outlined why I think that dignity 
and autonomy are different values and protect different things, and claimed that, while dignity is of 
general importance as a value, it can become most urgent in cases where autonomy is lacking, since it 
is often when dealing with persons with incapacity that the risk of dignity-violation can become most 
acute. My view of the relationship between the two values can be summarised by saying that 




with this assessment. 
 
III. The dignity norm as expressing a right 
7KH LGHD RI GLJQLW\ LV RI FRXUVH YHU\ LQWLPDWHO\ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK ULJKWV EXW QR VSHFLILF µULJht to 
GLJQLW\¶ LV HQXPHUDWHG HLWKHU LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO RU LQ 8QLWHG .LQJGRP GRPHVWLF ODZ ,QVWHDG GLJQLW\
VHHPVXVXDOO\ WREH UHJDUGHGDVDQXQGHUSLQQLQJ MXVWLILFDWLRQ IRUVXEVWDQWLYHULJKWVRUD µVRXUFHRI
ULJKWV¶ LPSO\LQJ L WKDW GLJQLW\ LV QRW D VXEVWantive right in itself, and (ii) that dignity is more 
overarching, and more fundamental, than any of the individual rights it grounds. 
 1HYHUWKHOHVV QXPHURXV UHIHUHQFHV WR D µULJKW WR GLJQLW\¶ FDQ EH IRXQG LQ WKH DFDGHPLF
literature on dignity. Dworkin (1993) speaks of ³the right to dignity´, although he distinguishes 
between the notion of a right to live in conditions which positively promote dignity (understood as 
µVHOI-UHVSHFW¶RQ WKHRQHKDQGDQGDQDUURZHUQHJDWLYH ³right not to suffer indignity´ on the other 
 'ZRUNLQ KLPVHOI PHDQV WKH ODWWHU ZKHQ KH UHIHUV WR µWKH ULJKW WR GLJQLW\¶ 3ROOPDQQ 
refers WR KXPDQ ULJKWV DV ³ULJKWV WR >GLJQLW\¶V@ SURWHFWLRQ´   Furthermore, as some have 
observed, some jurisdictions do recognise a speciILF µULJKW WR GLJQLW\¶ 0F&UXGGHQ  S
2¶0DKRQ\ D .OXJ KDV QRWHG ³D VSHFLILF ULJKW WR GLJQLW\ LQ ERWK *HUPDQ DQG 6RXWK $IULFDQ
MXULVSUXGHQFH´ .OXJ  S $UWLFOH  RI WKH %DVLF /DZ IRU WKH )HGHUDO 5HSXEOLF RI
*HUPDQ\UHDGV³Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all 
VWDWHDXWKRULW\´$OWKRXJKSKUDVHGDVDGXW\WKLVFDQEHUHDGDVHQVKULQLQJDVSHFLILFµULJKWWRGLJQLW\¶
(Alexy, 2002).  




existing) GLJQLW\YLRODWHG¶1HYHUWKHOHVV2¶5HJDQ-VWDWHGLQWKHFDVHRIDawood v.Minister of Home 
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Affairs,15 that ³GLJQLW\ LV QRW RQO\ D YDOXH IXQGDPHQWDO WR RXU &RQVWLWXWLRQ it is a justiciable and 
enforceable right that must be respected and protected´ 3DUD HPSKDVLV DGGHG 6KH DOVR
UHFRJQLVHG KRZHYHU WKDW ³>L@Q PDQ\ FDVHV«ZKHUH WKH YDOXH RI KXPDQ GLJQLW\ is offended, the 
primary constitutional breach occasioned may be of a more specific right such as the right to bodily 
LQWHJULW\WKHULJKWWRHTXDOLW\RUWKHULJKWQRWWREHVXEMHFWHGWRVODYHU\VHUYLWXGHRUIRUFHGODERXU´
(Para.35)16  
 A specific right tRGLJQLW\VHHPVDOVR WREHZULWWHQ LQWR,VUDHO¶V%DVLF/DZ7KHSDUWRI WKH
law relating to Human Dignity and Liberty (1992) provides both that ³>W@KHUHVKDOOEHQRYLRODWLRQRI
WKH OLIH ERG\ RU GLJQLW\ RI DQ\ SHUVRQ DV VXFK´ Para. DQG WKDW ³>D@OO SHUsons are entitled to 
SURWHFWLRQRIWKHLUOLIHERG\DQGGLJQLW\´Para.4). As with the example from South Africa, this reads 
not as a right to GLJQLW\DVVXFKEXWDVDULJKWWRKDYHRQH¶VSUH-existing dignity respected/ protected. 
Its inclusion as a distinct provision, rather than as part of an explanatory narrative, however, seems to 
indicate that dignity is not seen here (only?) as a source or justification of rights, but (also?) as a 
stand-alone right-in-itself.   
 Perhaps the particular histories of these nations create a powerful cultural imperative for 
foregrounding and emphasising dignity, which enshrining it as a right-in-itself is meant to achieve. 
7KHLGHDRIDVSHFLILFµULJKWWRGLJQLW\¶RXJKWWREHtreated with caution, however. First, there is reason 
to doubt whether the existence of such a right can make logical sense. In international human rights 
GLVFRXUVHDQGMXULVSUXGHQFHµKXPDQGLJQLW\¶LVFRQFHLYHGRIDVLQKHUHQWDQGLQDOLHQDEOHZHDUHDOO
born with dignity, and no-one and nothing can remove it from us.17 But if dignity is inherent, I do not 
need to acquire it; and if it is inalienable, I need no protection against its loss (Killmister, 2010, 
                                                          
15
 [2000] 5 Law Reports of the Commonwealth 147, 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) 
16
 Ibid. Were it not impossible within the confines of this article, a lot more could be said about the concept of 
dignity in the context of South African jurisprudence; for example, how dignity might interact with the African 
philosophical concept of  ?ubuntu ?, which was deployed as a constitutional principle by the Constitutional Court 
in the case of S v Makwanyane and Another (CCT3/94) [1995] ZACC 3), and which seems, like dignity, to be a 
value/virtue grounded in human interconnectedness.  
17
 The Preamble and Article 1 of the UDHR, quoted above, are examples. The use of dignity to denote an 
intrinsic worth possessed by all human beings simply by virtue of their being human also abounds in the 
academic literature on dignity. See, inter alia: Mattson and Clark (2011); Rendtorff (2002); Nordenfeld (2004); 
McCrudden (2008); Hale (2009); and Haugen (2010). 
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p.162). If DµULJKWWRGLJQLW\¶LVDULJKWWRVRPHWKLQJHYHU\ERG\DOUHDG\KDVDQGFDQQRWORVH it makes 
no sense.  
 Talk of dignity as a right-in-itself is not only senseless, but damaging, according to 
2¶0DKRQ\ LQ WKDW LW LV SURQH WR FUHDWH FRQFHSWXDO FRQIXVLRQ DERXW WKH QDWXUH RI WKH UHODWLRQVKLS




 being afforded their human rights in practice. The other is that a person achieves human 




ZKLFK2¶0DKRQ\VXSSorts, is the mainstream way of conceiving the relationship between rights and 
dignity, and is summarisHG E\ $QGRUQR ZKHQ KH ZULWHV WKDW ³ULJKWV derive from human dignity; 
human dignity is the foundation of human rights; human dignity is not a kind of super-right, but rather 
WKH XOWLPDWH VRXUFH RI DOO ULJKWV´ $QGRUQR  HPSKDVLV LQ RULJLQDO 7KLV FRQFHSWLRQ RI WKH
relationship is compatible with the idea of dignity as inherent and inalienable, and as denoting the 
intrinsic worth of all human beings. The idea of dignity as a right-in-itself, by contrast, promotes the 
latter type of view, since a right to dignity only makes sense if dignity is not already intrinsic in all 
human beings. Those who want to use dignity to denote inherent, intrinsic worth must reject the 
notion of dignity as a right-in-itself as erroneous, therefore, along with any rhetoric that refers to lives 
ODFNLQJLQGLJQLW\RUWRULJKWVYLRODWLRQVµVWULSSLQJ¶SHRSOHRIWKHLUGLJQLW\2¶0DKRQ\DS
Such references are mistakenFRQIXVLQJDQGSOD\LQWRWKHKDQGVRIGLJQLW\¶VGHWUDFWRUV2¶0DKRQ\
2012a, pp.559 and 565). 
 $VHFRQGSUREOHPZLWK WKH LGHDRI D µULJKW WRGLJQLW\¶ LV WKDW LW LV GRXEWIXOZKHWKHU VXFKD
right can carry any specific normative content not already covered in other, substantive provisions. 
What could understanding dignity as a right-in-itself add to the combined jurisprudence of Articles 3 
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and 8 of the ECHR, for example? What distinctive jurisprudential content could develop around a 
VSHFLILFµULJKWWRGLJQLW\¶LQMXULVGLFWLRQVZKHUHWKH&RQYHQWLRQKDVOHJDOIRUFHRULQDMXULVGLFWLRQOLNH
the United States, where matters of dignity can be debated and adjudicated under the auspices of the 
various Constitutional Amendments? The German Constitutional Court held, in the µGerman Airliner 
Case¶,18 that  
  
 the duty to respect and protect human dignity generally forbids making any human being a 
 mere object of the actions of the state. Any treatment of a human being by the state that - 
 because it lacks the respect for the value that is inherent in every human being - would call 
 into question«[his or] her status as a subject of law, is strictly forbidden. (Para.121) 
 
2QWKHIDFHRILWWKLVFRXOGDSSHDUWRGHILQHWKHµULJKWWRGLJQLW\¶Ds a specific right not to be treated 
DVD³PHUHREMHFW´RUGHQLHGRQH¶VVWDWXVDVDOHJDOVXEMHFW7KLVLVVWLOODEVWUDFWHQRXJKKRZHYHUIRU
its practical meaning to require explication in a raft of more substantive rights (each with an attendant 
jurisprudence), and how this would improve upon the understanding within which dignity is a 
background justification for, or foundation of, the human rights system (and the particular rights 
within it) is unclear. Indeed, an understanding wherein dignity, as a fundamental value, underpins 
various rights seems to make better sense than an understanding wherein dignity is seen both as an 
underpinning justification/source, and also as one of the enumerated rights themselves. In the latter 
understanding, dignity (the underpinning value) appears to be sourcing / justifying itself (dignity-the-
right); moreover, there is an unexplained gap between the substantive character of the other rights (to 
OLIHSULYDF\DQGVRRQDQGWKHPXFKPRUHDEVWUDFWµULJKWWRGLJQLW\¶7KLVUHFDOOV2¶0DKRQ\¶VSRLQW
that treating dignity as a right in itself obscures the nature of the relationship between dignity and 
rights.  
 A similar VXJJHVWLRQLVWKDWDULJKWWRGLJQLW\LVD³ULJKWWRKDYHULJKWV´HJ(QGHUV
again, however, this seems redundant. If I have all of the substantive rights themselves, why would I 
QHHG DQ DGGLWLRQDO µULJKW WR KDYH WKHP¶" And if I live in a system which fails to acknowledge the 
                                                          
18
 Case No. 1 BvR 357/05 115 BVerfGE 118. 
14 
 
substantive rights, what is the likelihood that such a system would acknowledge a free-VWDQGLQJµULJKW
WR GLJQLW\¶¶ULJKW WR KDYH ULJKWV¶" 7KH NLQGV RI V\VWHP ZLWKLQ ZKLFK D µULJKW WR KDYH ULJKWV¶ PLJKW
plausibly be found are precisely those in which it would add nothing of substance. 
I have noted already that the prominence of extreme dignity-violation in the recent histories 
RI *HUPDQ\ DQG 6RXWK $IULFD DQG LQ WKH QDUUDWLYH RI ,VUDHO¶V FUHDWLRQ VHHPV WR DFFRXQW IRU WKH
prominence of dignity-SURWHFWLRQLQWKHVHVWDWHV¶FXUUHQWODZV3HUKDSVWKHQWKHSRint of enumerating 
a specific right to dignity is not to add substantive content to the legal system, but to fulfil a purely 
µH[SUHVVLYH¶UROH6XQVWHLQQRWHVWKDW³VRPHWLPHVSHRSOHVXSSRUWDODZQRWEHFDXVHRILWVHIIHFWVRQ
norms, but because they belieYH WKDW LW LV LQWULQVLFDOO\ YDOXDEOH IRU WKH UHOHYDQW µVWDWHPHQW¶ WR EH
PDGH´6XQVWHLQS+HHODERUDWHV 
 
There can be no doubt that law, like action in general, has an expressive function. Some 
people do what they do mostly because of the statement the act makes; the same is true for 
those who seek changes in law. Many debates over the appropriate content of law are really 
debates over the statement that law makes, independent of its (direct) consequences. (p.2051)  
 
Enders seems to support WKH LGHDRIDQ³H[SUHVVLYH IXQFWLRQ´RI WKH ULJKW WRGLJQLW\ LQ WKH*HUPDQ
FRQWH[WZKHQKH UHPDUNV WKDW³WKHFRPPLWPHQW WRKXPDQGLJQLW\ UHPLQGV WKH OHJLVODWRU WKH FRXUWV
and other jurists to always keep clearly in mind that the human is a self-conscious intellectual and 
HWKLFDOEHLQJDQG WKHUHIRUHZRUWK\RIUHVSHFW´(QGHUVS%XW LI WKHVXSSRVHGEHQHILWRID
VHSDUDWH µULJKW WR GLJQLW\¶ is simply to highlight, emphasise, or spell out more clearly the central 
importance of dignity within a given legal system, is this not better achieved by having dignity written 
into the preamble or explanatory narrative framing the substantive rights? In that context, the status of 








threat to the identity and integrity of the human species such as human reproductive cloning and 
germ-line interventions´ +RZHYHU DV $QGRUQR SRLQWV RXW ³KXPDQ ULJKWV RQO\ EHORQJ WR H[LVWLQJ
LQGLYLGXDOV QRW WR KXPDQLW\ DV D ZKROH´ VR WKDW Dny ³ULJKW WR GLJQLW\´ FRXOG RQO\ EH RI XVH LQ
protecting against harm to existing individuals; not harm to humanity, or to future generations.  
7KHSUHVHQWGLVFXVVLRQ LVQRWLPPHGLDWHO\FRQFHUQHGZLWKµVSHFLHVGLJQLW\¶EXWVSHFLILFDOO\
with the status of the norm requiring respect for the equal dignity of all [individual] human beings. 
7KHH[LVWHQFHDQGVRXUFHRIµVSHFLHVGLJQLW\¶LVDQRWKHUDOEHLWSHUKDSVUHODWHGPDWWHUVR$QGRUQR¶V
FDXWLRQ FDQQRW IRUP SDUW RI WKH SUHVHQW µFDVH DJDLQVW¶ D ULJKW WR GLJQLW\ 1HYHUWKHOHVV WKH GRXEWV
raised already over whether such a right can make strict logical sense or carry any distinctive 
normative content still weigh in favour of the conclusion that, even if it is sometimes useful to invoke 
D µULJKW WR GLJQLW\¶ IRU UKHWRULFDO RU H[SUHVVLYH SXUSRVHV WKH GLJQLW\ QRUP LI LW LV WR SHUIRUP D
distinctive role in law, must be more than this. 
  
IV. Is the dignity norm a legal principle? 
 
ȋȌǮǯ 
$OWKRXJK WKHUH DUH VRPH VFKRODUV ZKR GHQ\ WKH H[LVWHQFH RI µSULQFLSOHV¶ DV D discrete category of 
legal norm (see, e.g., Günther, 1988), the category of legal principles as distinct from legal rules is 
widely acknowledged (see, e.g. Dworkin, 1978; Alexy, 2002; Raz, 1972; Waldron, 1997) and 
principles play a central role in mainstream theories of law (Dworkin, 1986; Alexy, 2002). Although 
'ZRUNLQ¶V ZRUN 'ZRUNLQ   EURXJKW WKH UROH RI SULQFLSOHV LQ ODZ WR XQSUHFHGHQWHG
scholarly attention, it has been noted that their existence was acknowledged prior to this, particularly 
in continental European legal systems and by scholars like Esser (Raz, 1972; Muniz, 1997; Alexy, 




 Legal theorists engage in complex disagreements about the structure of legal principles, the 
precise nature of their normative character, their relationship with other normative legal concepts, 
such as rules and rights, and what the presence of principles in the legal framework means for the 
conceptual relationship between law and morality (see, e.g., Raz, 1972; Dworkin, 1978 and 1986; 
Waldron, 1997; Muniz, 1997; Alexy, 2002 and 2010; Poscher, 2009).  What matters for present 
SXUSRVHVLVRQO\WKDWZHDUHDEOHWRGHFLGHZKHWKHUµSULQFLSOHRIODZ¶µOHJDOSULQFLSOH¶LVDJRRGZD\
to describe the dignity norm. I will suggest that the idea that the dignity norm can be described 
meaningfully as a legal principle really fails to get off the ground at all, so that recourse to more 
detailed argument about principles and their operation becomes unnecessary. What we do need, at this 
stage, is a mainstream description (since an uncontested one would be impossible) of what a 
µSULQFLSOHRIODZ¶LVDQGDEDVLVIRUDUJXLQJWKDWµUHVSHFWIRUKXPDQGLJQLW\¶HLWKHUILWs or (as I will 
claim) does not fit with that description.  
 Academic discussion of legal principles often begins by distinguishing principles from rules 
and emphasisLQJ WKHLU FKDUDFWHU DV µQRQ-UXOH VWDQGDUGV¶ LQGHHG 'ZRUNLQ KDV defined principles as 
beiQJ ³WKH ZKROH VHW RIVWDQGDUGV RWKHU WKDQ UXOHV´ 'ZRUNLQ  S). There are various 
suggestions about how the two types of standard can be distinguished from one another. One 
suggested criterion is that principles are ³QRUPV RI UHODWLYHO\ KLJK JHQHUDOLW\´ DQG UXOHV ³QRUPV RI
UHODWLYHO\ ORZ JHQHUDOLW\´ $OH[\  S 2WKHU VXJJHVWLRQV LQFOXGH WKDW UXOHV DUH µFUHDWHG¶
norms, whereas principles evolve; WKDW SULQFLSOHV DUH ³UHDVRQV IRU UXOHV´ DQG WKDW SULQFLSOHV DUH
³QRUPVRIDUJXPHQWDWLRQ´ZKHUHDVUXOHVDUH³QRUPVIRUEHKDYLRXU´ (Alexy, 2002, p.46).  
 Dworkin (1978) provided the most celebrated version of the rule/principle distinction. He 
observed thatZKHUHDV³>U@XOHVDUHDSSOLFDEOHLQDQDOO-or-QRWKLQJIDVKLRQ´'ZRUNLQSD
princiSOH³VWDWHVDUHDVRQWKDWDUJXHVLQRQHGLUHFWLRQEXWGRHVQRWQHFHVVLWDWHDSDUWLFXODUGHFLVLRQ´ 
(p.26). Furthermore, unlike rules, principles KDYH ³D GLPHQVLRQ RI ZHLJKW RU LPSRUWDQFH´ S). 
When conflicting rules seem to apply to a case, only one of them can really apply, because rules 
operate in an all-or-nothing way; one of the conflicting rules must be invalid, or be subject to a newly-
identified exception.  By contrast, when two competing principles seem to apply, the conflict can be 
resolved by balancing the principles against one another. The result of the balancing exercise will be 
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that one of the principles outweighs the other, but as Alexy reminds us, this ³PHDQVQHLWKHUWKDWWKH
outweighed principle is invalid nor that it has to have an e[FHSWLRQEXLOWLQWRLW´$OH[\S 
 For $OH[\ SULQFLSOHV DUH ³RSWLPL]DWLRQ UHTXLUHPHQWV´ WKH\ DUH ³QRUPV FRPPDQGLQJ WKDW
VRPHWKLQJEHUHDOL]HGWRWKHKLJKHVWGHJUHHWKDWLVDFWXDOO\DQGOHJDOO\SRVVLEOH´$OH[\S
Principles can thuVEH³IXOILOOHGWRGLIIHUHQWGHJUHHV´GHSHQGLQJRQDFWXDOIDFWXDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVDQG
³FRXQWHUYDLOLQJSULQFLSOHVDQGUXOHV´SDQGQRWRQO\can they be fulfilled to different degrees; 
as norms commanding optimisation they demand to be fulfilled to the greatest degree possible. We 
cannot simply disregard a principle because another apparently-applicable principle conflicts with it; 
ZHDUHERXQGWRZHLJKWKHPLQWKHEDODQFHDQGFRQVLGHULQJZKDWLV³DFWXDOO\DQGOHJDOO\SRVVLEOH´WR
optimise the application of them both. The general rule of thumb seems to be that the more serious the 
interference with one of the principles, the more important the satisfaction of the other (Alexy, 2002, 




5HIHUHQFHV WR UHVSHFW IRU GLJQLW\ DV D µSULQFLSOH¶ DUH ZLGHVSUHDG LQ OHJDO DQG OHJDO-related) texts 
(see, e.g., Alexy, 2002; Andorno, 2010; Barroso, 2012; Dworkin, 2006 and 2011; Hennette-Vauchez, 
2007 and 2011; Iglesias, 2001; Rendtorff, 2002; and Simon, 2002), but they are problematic. Some of 
WKHSUREOHPVDUHPRUHRUOHVVSDUWLFXODUWRWKHLQGLYLGXDOZULWHUV¶DQDO\VHVRUto the contexts they are 
writing in. Alexy, for example, describes dignity (in the context of German constitutional law) as both 
a rule and a principle (Alexy, 2002, p.63). FXUWKHUPRUHZKDW LVPHDQWE\ µGLJQLW\¶ LQ WKH*HUPDQ
Basic Law seems to vary: on the one hand, the Federal Constitutional Court has characterised the set 
RI FRQGLWLRQV XQGHU ZKLFK GLJQLW\ LV LQYLRODEOH DV ³WKH DEVROXWHO\ SURWHFWHG FRUH DUHD RI SULYDWH 
DXWRQRP\´ $OH[\S on the other, it is difficult to see how it is autonomy that is being 
protected by the same court in striking down, for reasons of human dignity, legislation that would 
permit the shooting down of hijacked airliners even if innocent passengers were on board.19 Thus, 
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when Alexy describes dignity as a principle, this tells us little about either the form or the content of 
µGLJQLW\¶RUHYHQZKHWKHUZKDWKHLVGHVFULELQJDVDµSULQFLSOH¶LVVRPHWKLQJZHDUHFRQWHQWWR call 
µGLJQLW\¶DWDOO6LPLODUO\EHFDXVH%DUURVRGHILQHVGLJQLW\LQDZD\WKDWLGHQWLILHV it very closely with 
LQGLYLGXDODXWRQRP\ZKHQKHGHVFULEHVGLJQLW\DVDµSULQFLSOH¶KHLVDUJXDEO\VD\LQJOLWWOHPRUHWKDQ
that individual autonomy is a legal principle, which we know already.  
%DUURVR¶VGHVFULSWLRQRIGLJQLW\DVDOHJDOSULQFLSOHDOVRVuffers from another flaw, however, 
and this one, I think, must prove fatal to any attempt to define dignity as a legal principle. Having 
GHVFULEHG GLJQLW\ DV D ³SULQFLSOH´ S %DUURVR DFNQRZOHGJHV 'ZRUNLQ¶V SRLQW WKDW SULQFLSOHV
KDYHD³GLPHQVLRQRIZHLJKW´SDQG$OH[\¶VDFFRXQWRISULQFLSOHVDVQRUPVWKDWDUH³VXEMHFWWR
EDODQFLQJ DQG WR SURSRUWLRQDOLW\ DQG >ZKLFK@ GHSHQGLQJ RQ FRQWH[W«PD\ JLYH ZD\ WR RSSRVLQJ
HOHPHQWV´S)URPDOORIWKLV%DUURVRGUDZVWKHQRWXQUHDVRQDEOHFRQFOXVLRQ that dignity can 
EHEDODQFHGDJDLQVWRWKHUYDOXHVDQGPD\QRWDOZD\VSUHYDLO³KXPDQGLJQLW\DVDIXQGDPHQWDOYDOXH
and principle, should take precedence in most, but not allVLWXDWLRQV´SHPSKDVLVDGGHG 
 In its own narratives about itself, however, law, in jurisdictions that claim to value dignity at 
all, claims to elevate human dignity above all other values and interests, and never to permit its 
violation. Klein (2002) has observed that, in German constitutional law,  
 
any encroachment upon human dignity means a violation. This is not the case with other 
human rights,20 where interference with the protected rights may be justified by the limits 
which are, expressly or implicitly, provided for by the Constitution. By contrast, human 
dignity has an absolute effect. There is, according to the jurisprudence of the courts, no way to 
balance other legal interests, be they of other individuals or of the community, with the 
dignity of a person. (pp.148-149, emphasis added.)  
 
Accordingly, in the German airliner case,21 the German Federal Constitutional Court held that: 
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 Dignity is treated as both a right and a principle in the German Basic Law (Alexy, 2002, p.63) 
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 See supra n18. 
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 the duty to respect and protect human dignity generally forbids making any human being a 
 mere object of the actions of the state. Any treatment of a human being by the state that - 
 because it lacks the respect for the value that is inherent in every human being - would call 
 into question his or her quality as a subject, [his or] her status as a subject of law, is strictly 
 forbidden (Para.121, emphasis added).22 
We are accustomed (following Dworkin and Alexy) to understand legal principles as the kinds of 
norms that may be balanced against other values and realised to a greater or lesser extent. By contrast, 
any failure to realise dignity completely seems to be unconscionable. It is unlike other principles in 
that, although various aspects of dignity must often be weighed against one another to get the focus of 
the dignity picture right, dignity itself is never truly weighed against other values: no outcome can be 
both dignity-violating and legally-acceptable.  
Notwithstanding that in many situations human dignity is in fact violated, narratives 
(particularly legal narratives) about dignity insist that violations of human dignity are, legally-
speaking, impermissible and intolerable. As such, the official legal story about dignity ± implicitly, if 
not explicitly ± LVWKDWLWLVDQµDEVROXWH¶VWDQGDUG,WLVGLIILFXOWWREULQJWRPLQGDQ\RWKHUOHJDOQRUP
which has such an apparently-absolute character: the principle of sanctity is, ironically, not sacred, 
since it has been held that it must occasionally yield to the principle of self-determination;23 and the 
exercise of personal autonomy is of course subject to an infinite number of legal and practical 
limitations. The requirements of dignity, by contrast, do not yield to competing demands. Dignity 
does not conform to the mainstream understanding of what a legal principle is, then, since dignity is 
not treated, in law, as a value that may be weighed in the balance against competing values and 
realised incompletely.  
It is difficult to unearth any judicial rhetoric which purports explicitly to weigh or balance 
dignity against other things, or to enquire about the proper degree of dignity to be afforded in light of 
other considerations. It can be tempting to see the judicial weighing exercises that pit one right against 
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 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] A.C. 789 at 826H-827A per Hoffmann LJ. 
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DQRWKHU RU UDUHO\ SXUSRUW WR SLW µGLJQLW\¶ DJDLQVW VRPH VSHFLILF ULJKWV LQ WKLV ZD\24 Because of 
GLJQLW\¶V VXSSRVHGO\ µIRXQGDWLRQDO¶ UROH LQ KXPDQ ULJKWV :DOGURQ  KRZHYHU this activity is 
best understood as an attempt to get the dignity picture as a whole into the best possible focus ± to 
realise dignity in the fullest way possible ± UDWKHUWKDQLQWHUPVRIGHFLGLQJµKRZPXFKGLJQLW\¶ZH
VKRXOGVHWWOHIRULQDJLYHQFDVHDQGKRZPXFKZHFDQVDFULILFH7KHODZ¶VRIILFLDOQDUUDWLYHLVWKDW
we cannot sacrifice any: if dignity is at stake, it demands to be satisfied completely, even at the 
expense of satisfying other important values. In a legal system that includes the dignity norm, no 
practice or policy could survive a finding that it violated human dignity, and any judgment or statute 
that openly admitted to fulfilling the demands of dignity only partially, or not at all, would be legally 
(and probably culturally, politically and ethically) unacceptable.  
The reasons why law is unable to countenance partial- or non- fulfilment of the dignity norm 
will become clearer in the course of the section to follow, where I will argue that, where the dignity 
norm is present, it operates not as one principle among many, but as the substantive basic norm of the 




There is ample (and growing) evidence that the dignity norm has some sort of elemental role in law. 
In international and European human rights law systems, as noted already, dignity is treated by many 
as foundational, and as capable of grounding a multitude of individual rights and freedoms. The 
&DQDGLDQ 6XSUHPH &RXUW KDV UHSHDWHGO\ GHFODUHG GLJQLW\ DQ ³HVVHQWLDO LQWHUHVW´ DQG WKH EDVLV IRU
&DQDGLDQODZ¶VJXDUDQWHHRIVXEVWDQWLYHHTXDOLW\/HFNH\S0HDQZKLOHUHIHUHQFHVWRWKH
pre-eminence of dignity abound in recent academic literature (both legal and otherwise). For example, 
an emerging trend in international bioethics seems to be rejecting the dignity-scepticism of the 
previous mainstream (which privileged autonomy) and recognisLQJ UHVSHFW IRUGLJQLW\DV³the basic 
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 Station Film Co. v. Public Council for Film Censorship (1994) 50 PD (5) 661 is one example; the court 
purported to balance human dignity against freedom of expression. The case is probably better understood, 
however, as an attempt to give full effect to the value of dignity by weighing competing aspects of it. 
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normative prinFLSOH´ +DXJHQ  S DQG ³FHQWUDO DPRQJ LQWHUQDWLRQDO QRUPV RI ELRHWKLFV´
(Andorno, 2010, p.58, my translation).25 More generally, the dignity norm has been described 
YDULRXVO\ DV D ³VXSHU-SULQFLSOH´ $QGRUQR  D ³PHWD-SULQFLSOH´ .QRHSIIOHU DQG 2¶0DOOH\
2010, p.69), D³XQLTXHDQGKLJKHU-RUGHUSULQFLSOH«WKHSULQFLSOHEHKLQGWKHSULQFLSOHVWKHIRXQGDWLRQ
RIWKHHGLILFHRIHWKLFDOSULQFLSOHV´ (ibid. p.70), ³WKHKLJKHVWSULQFLSOHRIWKH>*HUPDQ@FRQVWLWXWLRQ´




)RUPXODWLRQV WKDW PDNH XVH RI WKH ODQJXDJH RI SULQFLSOHV ³VXSHU-SULQFLSOH´ ³PHWD
SULQFLSOH´´KLJKHVWSULQFLSOH´³KLJKHU-RUGHUSULQFLSOH´³EDVLFQRUPDWLYHSULQFLSOH´DQGVRRQDUH
unhelpful, I think: not only because such language is redolent of Dworkinian balancing, which I have 
already argued is inapplicable in the case of the dignity norm, but also because these terms imply that 
WKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQGLJQLW\DQGµRWKHU¶SULQFLSOHVRIODZLVDPDWWHURIGHJUHHZKHUHDVP\FODLm 
KHUH LV WKDW WKH GLJQLW\ QRUP KDV D FRPSOHWHO\ GLIIHUHQW VWDWXV LQ ODZ IURP WKDW RI µRUGLQDU\¶ OHJDO
principles. The difference between the two is, I claim, a matter of quality and not quantity. Similarly, 
UHIHUULQJWRGLJQLW\DVD³IXQGDPHQWDOYDOXH´IDils to capture the sense in which dignity, unlike other 
values, is not something which the law is prepared to balance against other considerations.  
$OH[\¶V XVH RI WKH SKUDVH ³VXEVWDQWLYH EDVLF FRQFHSW´ WR GHVFULEH WKH VWDWXV RI WKH LGHD RI
dignity in the German Basic Law (Alexy, 2002, p.299) comes closest, I think, to expressing both the 
LGHDWKDWWKHGLJQLW\QRUPLVµIXQGDPHQWDO¶LQWKHVHQVHRIEHLQJRIJUHDWLPSRUWDQFHDQGalso the idea 
of a necessary connection between dignity and law. Even this form of words is not ideal, however.  I 
have argued elsewhere (Neal, 2012a) that it is essential to recognisH WKDW µGLJQLW\¶ LV QRW D VLQJOH
concept, but rather a plurality of coQFHSWV JURXSHG XQGHU DQ µRUJDQLVLQJ LGHD¶ (see also Pollmann 
(2011), p.248), and GHVFULELQJ GLJQLW\ DV ³a >VLQJOH@ VXEVWDQWLYH EDVLF FRQFHSW´ REVFXUHV WKLV
important point.  
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 In my view, the best way to describe the legal role of the dignity norm is as the substantive 
basic norm in a given legal system. This formulation has the advantage of referring specifically to the 
dignity norm LWVHOIUDWKHUWKDQWRµGLJQLW\¶DVDQDEVWUDFWLGHDDQGLWalso evokes the kind of necessary 
and foundational connection between dignity and law that I am arguing for. 
My claim that dignity is the substantive basic norm may be prefigured in the work of Gustav 
5DGEUXFKLQWKHV-RYDQRYLüKDVDUJXHG-RYDQRYLüWKDW5DGEUXFK¶VSRVW-Second World 
War writings, published recently in English (Radbruch, 2006a and 2006b), posit a test for legal 
validity that essentially amounts to a dignity-WHVW +H SRLQWV WR 5DGEUXFK¶V REVHUYDWLRQs that some 
ODZV³GHOLEHUDWHO\EHWUD\ WKHZLOO WR MXVWLFH ± by, for example, arbitrarily granting and withholding 
human ULJKWV´DQG WKDW WKHVH ODZV³DUHVRXQMXVWDQGVR VRFLDOO\KDUPIXO WKDWYDOLGLW\ LQGHHG OHJDO
FKDUDFWHULWVHOIPXVWEHGHQLHGWKHP´5DGEUXFK, 2006b, p.FLWHGE\-RYDQRYLüDWp.156) But in 
what sense is this a µGLJQLW\¶ WHVW UDWKHU WKDQ D JHQHUDO µMXVWLFH¶ WHVW RU SHUKDSV D VOLJKWO\ PRUH
VSHFLILFµHTXDOLW\¶WHVW"It seems to be equality, rather than dignity, that Radbruch is concerned with 
when he writes that: ³:KHUHWKHUHLVQRWHYHQDQDWWHPSWDWMXVWLFH where equality, the core of justice, 
LVGHOLEHUDWHO\EHWUD\HGLQWKHLVVXDQFHRISRVLWLYHODZWKHQ>D@VWDWXWHLVQRWPHUHO\µIODZHGODZ¶LW
ODFNVFRPSOHWHO\WKHYHU\QDWXUHRIODZ´5adbruch, 2006a, p.7, emphasis added.) -RYDQRYLüDUJXHV
however, thaW ³WKH XOWLPDWH FULWHULRQ RI OHJDO YDOLGLW\ LQ >5DGEUXFK¶V@ IRUPXOD FRQFHUQV«KXPDQ
GLJQLW\´ -RYDQRYLü p.145) He bases this on the threshold Radbruch sets for invalidity, and the 
examples that inspired 5DGEUXFK¶VIRUPXODWLRQ in the first place.  
For RadbUXFKWKHWKUHVKROGIRULQYDOLGLW\LVUHDFKHGZKHQ³the conflict between statute and 
MXVWLFH UHDFKHV VXFK DQ LQWROHUDEOH GHJUHH WKDW WKH VWDWXWH DV µIODZHG ODZ¶ PXVW \LHOG WR MXVWLFH´
(Radbruch, 2006a, p.7) (Although Radbruch is writing specifically about statutes here, his formulation 
FDQEH DSSOLHGPRUHZLGHO\ WR DOO ³SRVLWLYH ODZ´) IQ5DGEUXFK¶V IRUPXOD DFFRUGLQJ WR -RYDQRYLü 
³WKH WKUHVKROG IRU H[WUHPH LQMXVWLFH DPRXQWV WR WKH LQIULQJHPHQW RI KXPDQ GLJQLW\´ -RYDQRYLü
p.162) In other words, it is when positive law violates human dignity WKDW³DQLQWROHUDEOHGHJUHH´RI
conflict between law and justice occurs. For example, Radbruch writes that ³[l]HJDOFKDUDFWHU LV«
lacking in all the [Nazi] statutes that treated human beings as subhuman and denied them human 
ULJKWV´5adbruch, 2006a, p.8) -RYDQRYLüSRLQWVWRRWKHUH[DPSOHVLQ5DGEUXFK¶VZRUNRIUHIHUHQFHV
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WR FHUWDLQ 1D]L ODZV¶ ³EHVWLDOLW\´ DQG WKHLU ³QHJDWLRQ RI KXPDQLW\ DQG KXPDQ ULJKWV´ -RYDQRYLü
p.162). Radbruch was writing in the mid-1940s, before it had become second nature to understand 
dignity as the core value animating the substance not only of national constitutions (including the 
German Basic Law of 1949) but of international human rights law. Nevertheless, it seems clear that 
any law ZKLFK WUHDWHGSHRSOHDV ³VXEKXPDQ´RU ³GHQLHG WKHPKXPDQ ULJKWV´RUZKLFK³DUELWUDULO\
JUDQW>HG@RUZLWK>KHOG@KXPDQULJKWV´ZRXOGEHFULWLFLsed nowadays under human rights law in terms 
of dignity-YLRODWLRQ7RWKLVH[WHQW-RYDQRYLü¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWdignity LV5DGEUXFK¶VXOWLPDWHFULWHULRQ
appears plausible.  
,I -RYDQRYLü¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ LV FRUUHFW WKHQ 5DGEUXFK makes a very specific type of 
FRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQGLJQLW\DQGODZZKHUHLQODZ¶VUHVSHFWIRUGLJQLW\LVDSUHUHTXLVLWHIRULWVYDOLGLW\ 
This is the same sort of connection I want to argue for here. In the following sections I will explore 
the idea of respect for dignity as the µsubstantive basic norm¶ by considering two important ways, 
identified by Waldron in his recent work (2005 and 2012), in which law and dignity are necessarily 
and fundamentally connected. 
 
ȋȌǯprocedures reveal a necessary connection between law and dignity 
Jeremy Waldron hDVUHFHQWO\ZRQGHUHG:DOGURQZKHWKHU WKHUH LV³DFRQFHSWXDOFRQQHFWLRQ
EHWZHHQGLJQLW\DQGWKHYHU\LGHDRIODZ´SWKDWUXQVHYHQGHHSHUWKDQWKHVWURQJDVVRFLDWLRQ
EHWZHHQGLJQLW\DQGKXPDQULJKWV:DOGURQDFNQRZOHGJHVWKDW³WKHYHU\IRUPDQd structure of a right 
conveys the idea of the right-EHDUHU¶VGLJQLW\´SDVKHRQFHSXWLWPHPRUDEO\³ULJKWVUHHNRI
GLJQLW\´:DOGURQS%XWKHPDLQWDLQVWKDWHQDFWLQJDQGVDIHJXDUGLQJULJKWVLVRQO\one of 
the ways in which law protecWVGLJQLW\'UDZLQJRQ)XOOHU¶VGLVFXVVLRQRIWKH³LQQHUPRUDOLW\RIODZ´
(Fuller, 1964), Waldron argues that in fact respect for dignity permeates the whole of the legal 
landscape. 
He SRLQWVILUVWWRODZ¶V³SHUYDVLYHHPSKDVLVRQVHOI-DSSOLFDWLRQ´S6), in other words, its 
SUHIHUHQFH IRU ³people applying officially promulgated norms to their own conduct, rather than 
ZDLWLQJ IRU FRHUFLYH LQWHUYHQWLRQ IURP WKH VWDWH´ S In emphasising self-application, law 
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DVVXPHV WKDW ³RUGLQDU\ SHRSOH DUH FDSDEOH RI DSSO\LQJ QRUPV WR WKHLU RZQ EHKDYLRU´ S -  in 
HIIHFW RI ³acting like officials - recognizing a norm, apprehending its bearing on their conduct, 
PDNLQJDGHWHUPLQDWLRQDQGDFWLQJRQWKDW´S7KLV shows that 
 
legal systems operate« by using, rather than short-circuiting, the agency of ordinary human 
LQGLYLGXDOV 7KH\ FRXQW RQ SHRSOH¶V FDSDFLWLHV IRU SUDFWLFDO XQGHUVWDQGLQJ IRU VHOI-control, 
for self-monitoring and  modulation of their own behaviour in relation to norms that they can 
grasp and understand.  (p. 206)  
 
Waldron agrees with Fuller that this dedication to promoting individual agency and self-government 
³UHSUHVHQWVDGHFLVLYHFRPPLWPHQWE\ODZWRWKHGLJQLW\RIWKHKXPDQLQGLYLGXDO´S Inevitably, 
WKHUHDUHPDQ\FDVHVZKHUHVRPHIRUPRIRIILFLDOGLVSXWHUHVROXWLRQLVUHTXLUHGEXWLQVXFKFDVHV³WKH
law strains as far as possible to look for ways of enabling voluntary application of its general norms 
DQGPDQ\RILWVSDUWLFXODUGHFUHHV´ (p.206, emphasis added.)  
 Thus, law tries to enable self-application to some extent, even where institutional intervention 
is unavoidable. But Waldron sees respect for dignity as embedded in legal processes anyway, since 
³>G@LJQLW\VHHPVWR hook up in obvious ways with juridical ideas about hearings and due process and 
VWDWXV WR VXH´ S He identifies several features of legal processes that he says evince a 
commitment to respect for dignity. The structure of legal hearings, for example JLYHV ³HDFK
SDUW\«WKHRSSRUWXQLW\WRSUHVHQWDUJXPHQWVDQGVXEPLVVLRQV«DQGDQVZHUWKRVHRIWKHRWKHUSDUW\,Q
WKHFRXUVHRIDOORIWKLVERWKVLGHVDUHWUHDWHGUHVSHFWIXOO\DQGDERYHDOOOLVWHQHGWR«´S7KLV
VWUXFWXUH³HPERGLHVDFUXFLDOGLJQLWDrian idea²respecting the dignity of those to whom the norms are 
DSSOLHGDVEHLQJVFDSDEOHRIH[SODLQLQJWKHPVHOYHV´S7KHQDWXUHRIOHJDODUJXPHQWDWLRQDQG
legal decision-making, too, is respectful of dignity: in requiring reasoned arguments from both sides, 
IROORZHGE\DGHFLVLRQWKDWSURFHHGVXSRQWKHPDQGLVMXVWLILHGE\ZD\RIUHDVRQVODZ³SUHVHQWVLWVHOI
WRLWVVXEMHFWVDVVRPHWKLQJWKDWRQHFDQPDNHVHQVHRI´S7KLVLVQRWRQO\DERXWPDNLQJVHQVH
of individual decisions, but  also about placing individual outcomes in context  so as to make sense of 
the body of law as a whole system that has a logic and coherence to it (p.210).   
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Another feature of law that reveals its commitment to respecting dignity, Waldron says, is the 
aspiration thDW DOO VKRXOG ³have equal access to the law, participate equally in its proceedings, and 




One of the most important of these is legal representation. Dignity demands that everyone has the 
opportunity to present her case and be heard, but a particular litigant may lack knowledge and 
understanding of the law; she may lack the intelligence necessary to choose the best arguments and 
build a clear and persuasive legal case; she may lack the confidence for public speaking, or have an 
unpleasant voice or annoying mannerisms; she may, indeed, be worn down or depressed by the 
circumstances which have led her to court in the first place.  The right to counsel safeguards the 
³GLJQLW\RIEHLQJKHDUG´E\SURYLGLQJ IRUSURIHVVLRQDODGYRFDF\ LQRUGHU WR OHYHO WKHSOD\LQJ ILHOG
and thus represents yet another dignity-protecting feature of the legal process (pp. 215-6).  
 In summary, wherever possible, law ³>UHVSHFWV@SHRSOHHQRXJKWRHQWUXVWWKHPZLWKIURQW-line 
self-DSSOLFDWLRQ RI OHJDO QRUPV´ (p.211). Where complete self-application is impossible, and 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOLQYROYHPHQWLVQHFHVVDU\ODZ¶VSURFHGXUHVUHVSHFWSHRSOH¶VGLJQLW\E\OLWHUDOO\³JLYLQJ
WKHPDIDLUKHDULQJ´DQGE\VHHNLQJWRPDNHLWVSURFHVVHVDQGWKHLURXWFRPHVLQWHOOLJLEOHSUHGLFWDEOH
and accountable. In all of these ways, 
 
 law pays respect to the people who live under it, conceiving them as the bearers of reason and 
 intelligence. The individuals whose lives law governs are treated by it as thinkers who can 
 JUDVSDQGJUDSSOHZLWKWKHUDWLRQDOHRIWKDWJRYHUQDQFH«S 
 
This reveals, Waldron says ³DQ LPSOLFLW FRPPLWPHQW WR GLJQLW\ LQ WKH WLVVXHV DQG VLQHZV RI ODZ´
(p.222). 
 Now, it could be claimed that these procedural requirements reveal a necessary relationship 
not between law and dignity, as Waldron and Fuller maintain, but between law and autonomy, since 
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WKH UHTXLUHPHQWV VHHP DOO WR EH DERXW UHVSHFWLQJ LQGLYLGXDOV¶ FDSDFLWLHV WR WKLQN DQG VSHDN IRU
themselves and to be active participants in the legal process. As we have seen, self-application 
concerns  ?ƚhe agency of ordinary human individuals´ DQG ³SHRSOH¶V FDSDFLWLHV IRU SUDFWLFDO
understanding, for self-control, [and] for self-monitoring´ DQG WKH UHTXLUHPHQWV UHODWLQJ WRKHDULQJV
DUHDERXWFRQFHLYLQJRILQGLYLGXDOVDV³EHDUHUVRIUHDVRQDQGLQWHOOLJHQFH´ 
Earlier, when arguing that dignity should not be conflated with autonomy, I acknowledged 
that autonomy will often represent an important part of the dignity picture. Accordingly, I want to 
agree that the features Waldron and Fuller highlight here are most immediately concerned with 
respecting individual autonomy, and would add that the respect for autonomy evident in ODZ¶V
procedures points towards, and not away from, a fundamental connection between law and dignity. 
Autonomy is far from being all there is to dignity: respecting dignity will not always involve 
respecting autonomy, and conversely, it is conceivable that someone might respect autonomy (and 
therefore get that part of the dignity picture right) while failing to respect other aspects of human 
dignity. At least to the extent that it respects autonomy, therefore, law honours dignity. But the next 
section brings out more clearly how the fundamental connection between law and dignity goes 
beyond respect for autonomy.  
 
 ȋȌǯnon-brutality reveals a necessary connection between law and 
dignity 
Even when law is at its most coercive, Waldron says, it evinces a commitment to respecting the 
GLJQLW\RILWVVXEMHFWV,QGHHG³[it] is because law is coercive, because its currency is ultimately life 
and death, prosperity and ruin, freedom and imprisonment, that its inherent commitment to dignity is 
VRPRPHQWRXV´:DOGURQSHPSKDVLVDGGHG:DOGURQFRQQHFWVWKLVZLWKDQDUJXPHQWKH
has previously made about the prohibition on torture conVWLWXWLQJZKDWKHFDOOV D ³OHJDODUFKHW\SH´
:DOGURQ%\³DUFKHW\SH´KHPHDQV³DUXOHZKLFKKDVVLJQLILFDQFHQRWMXVWLQDQGRILWVHOIEXW




EUHDN WKH FRQQHFWLRQ EHWZHHQ ODZ DQG EUXWDOLW\ DQG WR UHLQIRUFH >ODZ¶V@ FRPPLWPHQW WR KXPDQ
dignity, even when law is at its most forceful and its subjects are at tKHLU PRVW YXOQHUDEOH´ ibid. 
p.1739) He expands upon this as follows in the later piece: 
 
 People may fear and be deterred by legal sanctions, they may on occasion be literally forced 
 against  their will by legal means or by legally empowered officials to do things or go places 
 they would not  otherwise do or go to.  But even when this happens, they are not herded like 
 cattle or broken like horses or beaten like dumb animals. Instead, there is...an enduring 
 connection between the spirit of law and respHFWIRUKXPDQGLJQLW\´:DOGURQS 
 
)RU:DOGURQ WKHQ ODZ¶VFRPPLWPHQW WRUHVSHFWIRUKXPDQGLJQLW\ LVUHYHDOHGQRWRQO\E\ WKHIDFW
that so many aspects of legal procedures presuppose a view of legal subjects as reasonable, intelligent 
beinJV ZKR GHVHUYH WR EH OLVWHQHG WR DQG WUHDWHG IDLUO\ EXW DOVR E\ ODZ¶V PRUH JHQHUDO DQG
fundamental rejection of brutality (the prohibition on torture being a totemic example of this 
UHMHFWLRQ  ,W LV WKH HVVHQFHRI OHJDO FRHUFLRQ WKDW LW FRHUFHV ³ZLWKRXW compromising the dignity of 
WKRVH ZKRP LW FRQVWUDLQV DQG SXQLVKHV´ Waldron, 2005, p. 1727); in this sense, legal coercion is 
³JHQXLQHO\UHVSHFWIXO´Waldron, 2012, p.217).  
 In 2005, Waldron was concerned only to point out the archetypal character of the prohibition 
on torture, and not to use this as the basis for any major claim about a necessary connection between 
dignity and law. By 2012, however, he is prepared to go further: 
 
 I am inclined to say that the idea of law or of a legal system now embodies the assumption 
 that everyone in a society ruled by law is treated as sui juris, as having full legal dignity in the 
 sense that I have been discussing. A system that embodied radical differences of legal dignity 
 might be a sort of proto-legal system, but we should not call it a true system of law. (Waldron, 
2012, p.215)26 
                                                          
26
 dŚĞ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ƚŽ  ?ůĞŐĂů ĚŝŐŶŝƚǇ ? Śere draw the eye; however, Waldron does not develop any distinction 




,QWKLVSDVVDJHDQGDOVRZKHQKHUHIHUVWR³an enduring  connection between the spirit of law and 
respect for human dignity´:DOGURQFRPHV very close to making the claim I advocate here, namely 
WKDWWKHGLJQLW\QRUPLVWKHµVXEVWDQWLYHEDVLFQRUP¶RIDOHJDOV\VWHPSURSHUO\-so-called. Although he 
does not say so explicitly, his arguments seem to imply strongly that law is, of its very nature, a 
normative system that aspires to treat its human subjects as beings whose dignity must be respected ± 
by one another, by the state, by corporations, organisations and groups, and (perhaps above all) by law 
itself, in its procedures, institutions, officials, norms, judgments, premises and background 
assumptions. 7KLVLVWKHVWURQJLPSOLFDWLRQIRUH[DPSOHZKHQ:DOGURQVD\VWKDWODZ¶V emphasis on 
self-DSSOLFDWLRQZKLFKKHVD\V³UHSUHVHQWVDGHFLVLYHFRPPLWPHQWE\law to the dignity of the human 
LQGLYLGXDO´p.206)) LVHVVHQWLDOLQ³GLIIHUHQWLDWLQJit sharply from systems of rule that work primarily 
E\PDQLSXODWLQJWHUURULVLQJRUJDOYDQLVLQJEHKDYLRXU´S 
 I have proposed in the context of another argument that human dignity can be understood in 
WHUPV RI D EDODQFH RU HTXLOLEULXP EHWZHHQ WKH µDQLPDO¶ DQG µWUDQVFHQGHQW¶ DVSHFWV RI KXPDQ
existence and selfhood (Neal, 2012b).  Human beings embody (quite literally) a combination of the 
material/finite/mortal, and the transcendent/infinite/sublime, and that our dignity consists in our 
(possibly unique) job of striking a balance between these two sets of qualities, while neither 
fetishising nor disparaging either. It is of the essence of this view of dignity that we are animals, but 
not brutes: 
 
 We aspire to be, not just animals, but moral beings: to pursue second-order preferences and 
 desires; to hold ourselves and others to standards of behaviour that surpass those we 
 tolerate from other animals and would settle for from ourselves if we were content to 
 fulfil only the animal side of our nature  (Neal, 2012b, 194, emphasis added). 
 
+XPDQ GLJQLW\ LV LQKHUHQWO\ µQRQ-EUXWDO¶ SUHFLVHO\ EHFDXVH LW LV D YDOXH WKDW DWWDFKHV WR humans as 
µWUDQVFHQGHQWDQLPDOV¶UDWKHUWKDQµEUXWHEHDVWV¶When -RYDQRYLü argues that RadbrucK¶VIRUPXODis a 
dignity-test, specifically, KHSRLQWV WR5DGEUXFK¶V UHIHUHQFH WR WKH ³EHVWLDOLW\´RI FHUWDLQ1D]L ODZV
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and to the fact that, for Radbruch, the threshold for intolerability seems to occur at the point where the 
YLRODWLRQLV³EUXWDO´-RYDQRYLü). A commitment to non-brutality just is a commitment to human 
dignity. As such, when Waldron identifies a fundamental commitment to non-brutality at the heart of 
law he is right to recognisHWKLVDVDIXQGDPHQWDODQGQHFHVVDU\FRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQWKH³LGHDRIODZ´
DQGWKHLGHDRIUHVSHFWIRUKXPDQGLJQLW\³(YHQZKHQODZLVDWLWVPRVWIRUFHIXODQGLWVVXEMHFWVDUH
DW WKHLUPRVWYXOQHUDEOH´± including when the weight of the law is being brought to bear on those 
convicted or suspected of the most heinous crimes ± law ought not to manipulate, terrorise, herd, 
break, or beat its subjects.  
 But what are we to make of the fact that many legal systems do perpetrate violations of 
dignity? Waldron gives a list of examples from the United States, including the torture of terrorist 
VXVSHFWV WKHGHOLEHUDWHKXPLOLDWLRQRISULVRQHUVDW*XDQWDQDPR%D\ WKH³WHUURULVLQJ´FRQGLWLRQVRI
detention in other US prisons, thHWUHDWPHQWRIGHIHQGDQWV LQFRXUWVDQG WKHXOWLPDWH³VDYDJHU\´RI
the death penalty. He cites France, the UK, Russia and Israel as other examples of legal systems 
ZKLFKKDYH³IDOOHQVKRUW´RIWKHGHPDQGVRIGLJQLW\'RHVWKLVPHDQWKDWWKHLGHDRIDQHFessary and 
fundamental connection between law and dignity is illusory? No, says Waldron: 
 
 The commitment to dignity that I think is evinced in our legal practices and institutions may 
 be thought of as immanently present even though we sometimes fall short of them. Our 
 practices sometimes convey a sort of promise and, as in ordinary moral life, it would be a 
 mistake to think that the only way to spot a real promise is to see what undertakings are 
 actually carried out. Law may credibly promise a respect for dignity, and yet fall short of that 
 in various respects. Institutions can be imbued in their  structures, practices, and procedures 
 with values and principles that they sometimes fall short of. In  these cases, it is fatuous to 
 present oneself as a simple cynic about their commitments or to neglect the power of 
 [immanent] critique as the basis of a reproach for their shortcomings. (Waldron, 2012, p.221) 
 
It would be wrong to deny the necessary connection between law and dignity on the basis that law 




:DOGURQ SXWV LW ³WKH WLVVXHV DQG VLQHZV RI ODZ´  $ FRPPLWPHQW LV QRW DEVHQW VLPSO\ EHFDXVH ZH
sometimes fail to make good on it. 1RWHWRR:DOGURQ¶VILQDOSRLQWthat if we use examples of failure 
to deny that the commitment is there in the first place, we can only deplore the shortcoming from an 
external perspective. We cannot level the particularly powerful kind of criticism that says to the 
HYLOGRHU³\RXDUHRIIHQGLQJQRWRQO\DJDLQVWP\VWDQGDUGVEXWDJDLQVW\RXURZQ\RXDUHIDLOLQJLQ
terms of yRXURZQDVSLUDWLRQVDQGFRPPLWPHQWV´2QWKHRWKHUKDQGLIZHHPEUDFHWKHLGHDWKDWa 
commitment to respect for human dignity is one of the defining characteristics of DµOHJDOV\VWHP¶ZH
can then condemn practices and policies that neglect, ignore, or positively violate dignity on the basis 
that these have no place in any legal system at all. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
What might be gained and lost, in a practical sense, by acknowledging the role of the dignity norm as 
D µVXEVWDQWLYH EDVLF QRUP¶" ,Q SDUWLFXODU VLQFH WKLV XQGHUVWDQGLQJ SRVLWV WKH GLJQLW\ QRUP DV D
foundational critical standard, might it deprive the norm of its current role as a practical standard in 
legal reasoning?  
Certainly, when understood as a right or a principle, the dignity norm is treated as a 
justiciable value; but it is not necessarily robbed of its justiciability when understood in the way I am 
SURSRVLQJ$OWKRXJK,KDYH LGHQWLILHGVRPHZD\V LQZKLFKWKHLGHDRIDµright WRGLJQLW\¶PLJKWEH
problematic, I have not suggested that it can never EH DSSURSULDWH WR UHIHU WR D µULJKW WR GLJQLW\¶
indeed, in some cases it might serve some important expressive function to do so. My point has been 
only that the idea of dignity-as-a-right in itself is vulnerable, and cannot be the only, or even the main 
way of characterising the dignity norm. To the extent that it is vulnerable on grounds of lack of logic 
or normative contentlessness, its current usefulness as a justiciable standard is questionable anyway. 
Similarly, my argument against understanding the dignity norm as a legal principle need not mean the 
loss of a practically-XVHIXO VWDQGDUG D NH\ SDUW RI P\ FDVH DJDLQVW WKH µSULQFLSOH¶ ODEHO KDV EHHQ
precisely that the dignity norm is not used (weighed, balanced, and incompletely realised) like a legal 
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principle anyway; as such, I am arguing for a relabeling that better reflects its actual use by judges and 
jurists, not recommending a change of practice. It is submitted, therefore, that we have nothing to lose 
by understanding the dignity norm in the way I propose here. 
 There are important things to gain, however. My primary motivation in exploring the function 
of the dignity norm has been to challenge the tendency to ascribe inappropriate labels to it, either by 
conflating it with autonomy, or by descrLELQJ WKH GLJQLW\ QRUP DV VWUDLJKWIRUZDUGO\ D µULJKW¶ RU D
µSULQFLSOH¶:HVWDQGWRJDLQFRQFHSWXDOFODULW\WKHUHIRUH0RUHRYHULIWKHGLJQLW\QRUPLVLQdeed a 
fundamental benchmark of justice DV :DOGURQ¶V ZRUN DQG WKH WUHDWPHQW RI GLJQLW\ E\ PDQ\ other 
legal scholars seems to suggest, then recognising it as such reveals an important, but hitherto 
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